Are social psychologists concerned with cross cultural differences in behavior?

10.02.11.2 Recent Research on Cross-cultural Psychopathology

Recent research on cross-cultural differences in psychopathology has attempted to explain the similarities and differences in terms of the cultural contexts. For example, while a pancultural nucleus of symptoms was found for schizophrenia and depression, a variety of cultural transformations was also identified. Draguns (1989) proposed a range of possible relations between culture and the manifestations of the disorders. These include:

magnification or exaggeration—a culturally characteristic behavior being caricatured and reduced to absurdity;

violation of cultural norms—doing what is not culturally permissible;

cultural differences in values affecting the characteristic modes of expressing psychopathology—symptom choice and expression being conceptualized as social transactions.

However, there are few studies that examine the functional relationship between cultural characteristics and cross-cultural differences in psychopathology. Draguns (1989) attempted to apply Hofstede's (1980) worldwide study of work-related values to manifestations of abnormal behavior across cultures. In Hofstede's original study, which involved employees from over 40 nationalities, four cultural dimensions were found to be capable of accounting for most of the cultural differences. These four dimensions were individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity/femininity. Hofstede (1983) had linked the dimension of individualism/collectivism to the distinction made earlier by Benedict (1946) between “guilt” (individualist) and “shame” (collectivist) cultures. However, the relationship between this value dimension and psychopathology involves a more subtle process. Rather than assuming that patients from some Asian cultures do not experience guilt, cultural differences may be found more in the way that guilt is expressed. In individualistic cultures, guilt may be expressed in absolute and abstract terms involving self-accusation and condemnation. In collectivistic cultures, guilt may be expressed in more concrete and interpersonal modes.

To date, there are few studies on cross-cultural psychopathology using the other three dimensions from Hofstede's study. Draguns (1989) further noted that psychopathology varied across cultures even when there was no substantial difference on Hofstede's four dimensions. He pointed to the need for more multicultural studies involving both normal and abnormal samples in order to formulate the functional relationship between cultural characteristics and psychopathology.

The series of studies on somatization among the Chinese described in earlier sections also illustrates how cross-cultural differences in the expression of symptomatology could be understood in terms of the culturally relevant cognitive schema and interpersonal contexts. Through these cultural studies, important dimensions that have not been examined in North American and Western European theories could be incorporated to increase the cultural sensitivity of these theories. This cultural sensitivity is becoming more important not only because ethnic and cultural pluralism is becoming more prevalent in many societies. What are thought to be indigenous categories can in fact be extended to explain the complexity of human personality and psychopathology within and across cultures.

One example of this combined emic–etic approach is the development of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory (CPAI; Cheung, Leung, Fan, et al., 1996) which integrated Western methods of personality assessment with folk concepts of personality in the Chinese culture. In addition to etic personality constructs, emic constructs which were not covered in translated personality inventories were included in the CPAI. Scales were developed for personality characteristics such as harmony, relationship orientation, face, modernization, and thrift, which are salient constructs for person descriptions among the Chinese. These scales were loaded on a factor labeled Chinese Tradition. The Chinese Tradition factor was found to be a relevant predictor of mental health measures especially for Chinese males. It enhanced life satisfaction and prevented the acting out of antisocial behavior particularly when the stress level was high (Cheung & Gan, 1996). The Chinese Tradition factor was also found to be culturally distinct from the five-factor structure of personality which is currently accepted as a universal model of personality (Cheung, Leung, Law, & Zhang, 1996). These emic constructs may introduce new dimensions of the personality structure to Western models of personality and psychopathology.

Conclusion

The subject of cross-cultural differences in creativity is very complex with many areas for debate, which this article has aimed to summarize briefly. The fact that creativity research appears to becoming more cross-cultural is a good thing for the field, but it is essential that researchers do consider the effect of using measures devised in one country for conducting research in another. It is possible to loosely categorize features of cultures as supportive or not supportive of creativity, but the traditional distinction of grouping cultures as Eastern and Western is too simplistic and masks the vast number of differences between one culture and another. There are hints that colonial oppression, or a totalitarian regime, inhibits a culture's creativity and this would tie in with the theory that countries with a small power distance would be less creative. But it is also true that sometimes these conditions can help creativity flourish, for example in Poland, where it became part of the national identity when the country was subsumed under communism. There is also evidence that the predominant features of creativity within a culture appear to tie in with that culture's creation ‘mythology’ or stories. Internationally, it appears that the interest in creativity from governments and business is increasing, which is helpful for its development, despite some resistance from those who see creativity as a threat to stability.

Cultural and developmental considerations

Cross-national and cross-cultural differences in the conceptions, manifestations, and societal responses to social anxieties and fears highlight the need to understand the connectedness of intensity levels of such concerns across continua. Which behaviors are considered “typical” and which ones are regarded as “abnormal” or “pathological” differ across groups. Social anxieties and fears, as well as SAD, exist internationally (Hofmann, Asnaani, & Hinton, 2010; Hong & Woody, 2007), across cultures, broadly defined. While there are many similarities across groups, there are disparate aspects as well, including unique, culturally-specific manifestations of social anxiety that go beyond DSM and other Western society conceptualizations. The Māori of New Zealand, for example, have the concept of whakamā, which involves shyness, embarrassment, and feelings of inadequacy, but also feelings of shame and being unsettled (Metge & Kinloch, 1978; Sachdev, 1990). A severe variant of this condition involves whakapeke, which is running away and hiding (Metge & Kinloch, 1978); this latter response may be akin to avoidant behavior observed in SAD in other cultural groups.

Epidemiological investigations have focused on factors such as nationality, culture, race/ethnicity, sex and gender, age, socioeconomic status, and urban–rural distinctions, both in terms of social anxieties and related disorders. This area of research is beset with a lack of clarity, however, regarding whether social anxiety is being evaluated (typically through self-reports), or whether impairment and life disruption due to social anxiety is being assessed (to diagnose a SAD). The heterogeneity of social anxieties, changing definitions of social phobia and SAD over time, inconsistency in assessment instruments across studies, and the lack of attention as to whether investigations focus on social anxiety in general or SAD in particular, all contribute to inconsistencies in the current epidemiological knowledge base.

Social anxieties, at both typical and pathological levels, are socially conceived, experienced, and expressed differently across nations and cultures (Caballo et al., 2008; Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010). There appears to be consistency in the conclusion that social anxieties are more frequently indicated on self-report scales in East Asia relative to the USA and Europe (e.g., Okazaki, Liu, Longworth, & Minn, 2002). Collectivist cultural orientations in East Asia (versus individualism in the latter areas) may help explain the functions of nonpathological social anxiety in these cultures in promoting sensitivity to others and awareness of one’s social impact. These differences in reported social anxiety appear to be mediated by unique social values and views of the self across Eastern and Western cultures (Hong & Woody, 2007). Conversely, the rate of SAD in East Asian cultures is markedly lower than in certain other countries (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Russia, USA) (Hofmann et al., 2010; Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010). SAD also may be diagnosed more often in distinct cultural groups (e.g, Native Americans in the USA, Udmurts in the Russian Federation) than the other constituent groups in some nations or regions (Hofmann et al., 2010; Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010). The differences in SAD prevalence may be related to unique social pressures on these cultural minority groups, or more likely to bias in measurement or inapplicability of the diagnostic criteria to those groups (Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010).

Allocentric anxieties, focused on one’s social effect on others, are observed in taijin kyofusho (TKS, from the Japanese) among East Asian cultural groups (Hofmann et al., 2010; Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010). It is described as a Cultural Syndrome in DSM-5. TKS has been of great interest in the SAD literature, given its similarities to and general consistency with DSM and ICD classifications. TKS appears to be of two subtypes, one of which partially overlaps with SAD, but which also has more allocentric qualities. In the other variant, the offensive subtype (Choy et al., 2008), there is anxiety about offending or embarrassing another person by one’s appearance or behavior, including physiologically based bodily functions such as emitting intestinal gas. An associated olfactory response syndrome has been specifically identified, in which there is concern about emanating noxious body odor (Lewis-Fernández et al., 2010).

In terms of other epidemiological considerations, there are data to suggest that people in rural areas report more social anxiety than their urban counterparts (Grant et al., 2005; Pakriev, Vasar, Aluoja, & Shlik, 2000) which may be testimony to learned responses (see Chapter 15 on basic behavioral mechanisms and processes), perhaps through social skill development on the basis of experience, through exposure that reduces anxiety, or other mechanisms. Greater and lesser population density may impact opportunities for such social learning to occur. Additionally, lifetime prevalence of social fears or anxieties appear to be similar between developed and developing countries (Stein et al., 2010). Consistent with the previous discussion of the reports of social anxieties vis a vis SAD diagnoses, the diagnostic prevalence of SAD is significantly higher in developed countries, compared to developing countries (Stein et al., 2010).

In considering sex and gender, the distinctions and different prevalence rates across self-reported social anxieties and diagnosed SAD (or related disorders) are further complicated by potentially different rates of treatment-seeking behavior. Areas to be considered between the sexes, then, are the prevalence of: (a) self-reported social anxiety and fear, (b) diagnosed SAD across population groups, and (c) patients reporting for and/or receiving treatment for SAD. Some earlier literature suggested males and females were more similar in prevalence of reported social anxieties and social phobia/SAD, relative to other types of anxieties and disorders. In fact, it was suggested in the past that more males than females may evidence clinically significant social anxieties (e.g., a higher prevalence of a social skill deficit type of social phobia; Marks, 1985), although the literature was equivocal in this regard.

More recently, there are a variety of data (e.g., Caballo et al., 2008; Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1994) indicating that, relative to males, females report greater intensity of social anxieties and a broader range of distressing social situations, although males indicate more anxiety than females in certain situations, and in other situations there are no differences. The literature has become directed toward a finer grain analysis of sex differences, beyond that of simply assessing overall social anxiety intensity levels, and focusing on specific types of social situations (e.g., asking for directions), as they may be experienced differently by males and females, based on social role and other factors (Turk et al., 1998). Sex differences in social anxieties and fears exist in many nations and cultures internationally, including Hispanic groups, and may be more pronounced in younger age groups (Caballo et al., 2008). Similarly, more females than males are diagnosed with SAD in the USA (Xu et al., 2012); this difference also has been demonstrated in some international groups (e.g., Europeans [Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005] and specific Russian groups [Pakriev et al., 2000]). Lifetime prevalence estimates of SAD in the USA indicate that more women than men are afflicted with this disorder (Kessler et al., 2012). This sex difference appears to exist regardless of type of social phobia (Kessler et al., 1998), and may be greater in younger cohorts (Hofmann et al., 2010; Kessler et al., 2012). Interestingly, the available data from specialty anxiety clinics in the USA suggest that there is an equal representation of male and female patients receiving treatment for SAD (Turk et al., 2008). Given the greater preponderance of social anxieties and fears, as well as diagnosed SAD among women, the female:male distribution in the SAD patient population in the USA is all the more noteworthy. Nevertheless, international data are not uniform in this regard, suggesting the possibility of cross-national, and likely cultural, differences in the distribution of females:males in SAD clinical populations (de Menezes, Fontenelle, & Versiani, 2006).

In spite of a number of differences across the sexes, social fears and anxieties and SAD are unique in that females and males typically differ less, in comparison to many other types of anxiety and fear, in which the female to male ratio is much higher. The evidence suggesting equal representation of males and females in specialized anxiety clinic samples, therefore is interesting, and deserving of further scientific scrutiny. Studying sex and gender differences in social anxiety and SAD, gender role, gender role identification, and sexual orientation all are important to consider (Hofmann et al., 2010), as are social role, expectations, and status associated with each sex.

In relation to age, socially-based anxieties and fears (e.g., separation anxiety) are experienced very early in life, continue throughout the lifespan, and may vary across adulthood as well (Ciliberti, Gould, Smith, Chorney, & Edelstein, 2011). Thus, extreme manifestations of such anxieties, in the form of SAD, often begin in the mid-teens or even early childhood (Hofmann & Barlow, 2002). The diagnosis of SAD likely can be reliably rendered as early as age six (Bögels et al., 2010). As explicated in the DSM-5, childhood and adolescence may be particular developmental periods in which transient social anxieties appear. Nevertheless, social anxieties can appear at various points in the developmental course of life, as in the case of older adults in the USA (and presumably in other Western cultures), whose social anxieties may be related to appearing socially competent, successfully navigating health care visits, being noticed as having a good memory or as being forgetful, and asking for help from others (Gould, Gerolimatos, Ciliberti, Edelstein, & Smith, 2012).

Empirical Findings

Little data is available on cross-cultural differences in the perception of social stimuli in patient groups, although abnormalities in self–other perception may form a model for the functioning of culture-based social cognition and vice versa (Fabrega, 1989). It has been shown that ER deficits in schizophrenia are similar across cultures (Lee, Lee, Kweon, Lee, & Lee, 2010). In contrast, schizophrenia patients of American Caucasian origin have been shown to be more highly skilled at the perception of emotions as compared to samples of African Americans and Latin Americans (Brekke, Nakagami, Kee, & Green, 2005). In a study of American, German, and Indian patients with schizophrenia (Habel et al., 2000), Indian patients performed significantly worse than the other groups on an emotion discrimination task using Caucasian faces. A study using both Caucasian and African American facial stimuli demonstrated that patients with schizophrenia were more likely to recognize same-race than other-race faces (Pinkham et al., 2008). In two studies that assessed social cognition in relation to depressed mood in Greek (Bernieri & Gillis, 1993) and North American (Gillis & Bernieri, 1993) college students, dyadic interaction videos were presented. College students with depressed symptoms were found to track female interaction partners to judge interactional contents. In a sample of Asian immigrants to the United States, these immigrants tended to focus more strongly on affective components of depression than on somatic components (Chen, Guarnaccia, & Chung, 2003). Furthermore, the level of self-attention has been identified as a mediator of cultural effects on depression.

Conclusions and Implications

The research discussed here has demonstrated marked cross-cultural differences in approaches to interpersonal morality. It has been seen that European-Americans maintain a more voluntaristic approach to interpersonal responsibilities than do Hindu-Indians. This is reflected in their tendencies to view responsiveness to others as a matter of personal discretion rather than of obligation. Even more notably, it is evident in their tendencies to treat interpersonal responsibilities as contingent on such nonmoral considerations, such as liking. With regard to responsibility judgments, our studies demonstrate that European-Americans are more prone than Hindu-Indians to hold individuals morally accountable for justice breaches and to downplay the significance of extenuating circumstances that may potentially mitigate such violations. In contrast to Hindu-Indians, European-Americans place more responsibility on agents for regulation of their affective and behavioral responses, and assume that such self-regulation can be achieved at an earlier age during childhood. Finally, our research has shown that European-Americans view a greater tension as existing between self and social role than Hindu-Indians. Thus, whereas European-Americans maintain that greater satisfaction is linked to voluntary, compared to role-based helping, Hindu-Indians assume that individuals experience the same satisfaction in the two cases. In a striking pattern of results, European-Americans associate negative implications with selfless helping behavior. Thus, an agent’s act of helping a friend at high cost to themselves is interpreted as an indication of weakness and is assumed to cause a strain in friendships. This contrasts with the positive attributions made by Hindu-Indians, with selfless behavior viewed as a sign of strength and as deepening interpersonal bonds.

It is important to emphasize that the observed cross-cultural differences are not matters of personality and do not imply that individuals from one culture are more caring or empathic than individuals from the other. Where the differences relate to behavior is in the contrasting cultural practices in the two contexts. Thus, for example, the observed cultural differences in voluntarism and in individual responsibility for conduct are reflected in contrasting life-course events, such as typical European-American behavioral practices of dating, moving away from home, and freely choosing a spouse, compared to typical Hindu-Indian behavioral practices of gender segregation, residence with parents into adulthood, and arranged marriages. Similarly, the European-American tendency to give weight to personal affinity and liking in assessing interpersonal responsibilities has links to the acceptability of divorce and of institutional care for elderly parents in the European-American culture, just as the Hindu-Indian tendency to treat interpersonal responsibilities as more contingent has links to the disapproval of these same types of practices in the Hindu-Indian culture.

In terms of implications, our work points to the existence of qualitative variability in forms of interpersonal morality and of self. It suggests not only that the type of duty-based orientation to interpersonal morality emphasized among traditional Hindu-Indian populations differs from the more voluntaristic approach to this domain embodied in the morality of caring framework (Miller, 1994) but also that it differs from conventional role-based approaches to this domain found in modern ‘Western cultural populations. Thus, there was little evidence among Indians of the type of perceived opposition between individual expression and role conformity that has been reported by Gilligan and her colleagues among women maintaining a conventional feminine approach to role expectations. For Hindu-Indians, duty does not take on the same type of perceived aversive quality that it more typically does for European-Americans with their more dualistic cultural views of self.

Our work points to the contrasting strengths of the approaches to interpersonal morality emphasized among European-Americans and Hindu-Indians and highlights the value of understanding each approach from a somewhat relativistic perspective. Thus, it was seen that the orientation observed among European-Americans not only has such strengths as an emphasis on individual freedom of choice and on personal responsibility for conduct but also certain characteristic weaknesses. For example, the orientation toward interpersonal responsibilities observed among European-Americans gives rise to a pressure for conformity and a type of insecurity not observed among Hindu-Indians. To the extent that interpersonal responsibilities are seen as contingent on liking, European-Americans experience more pressure to act in a way that ensures that they maintain the others positive regard than Hindu-Indians, for whom there is less discretion about whether or not to meet the needs of in-group members. Because interpersonal commitments are more voluntaristic among European-Americans than among Hindu-Indians, European-Americans may also experience a greater concern about potential isolation and abandonment than Hindu-Indians.

Most generally, our results speak to the vision embodied both in communitarian theory and in the morality of caring framework of the desirability of achieving an integration of community and autonomy in systems of morality. The results highlight the need to examine critically the claims that such an integration is empirically achieved in existing moral systems. Contrary to Gilligan’s assertion, for example, our results suggest that individuals effect a certain compromise between community and autonomy rather than a stance that fully realizes both orientations. Thus, it was observed, that whereas there was greater emphasis on autonomy among European-Americans than among Hindu-Indians, there was arguably a weaker and more contingent notion of community in family and friendship relationships. Importantly, the Indian system not only gives less weight to autonomy but maintains a notion of community that does not extend to out-group relationships.

Our results do not directly challenge philosophical efforts to define the integration of community and autonomy as an ideal. The integrity of an ideal does not depend on empirical findings. However, our results highlight the need to examine more critically potential contradictions in this ideal as presently formulated. As was seen, for example, the emphasis on freedom of choice that promotes autonomy in the morality of caring among European-Americans also leads to community being more limited in scope and more contingent on personal preference than is the case in a culture, such as Hindu-India, that tends to emphasize a more interdependent cultural view of self. To the extent that individuals’ sense of self and of relationships differ markedly in contrasting cultural contexts, their visions of the ideal may also differ. What constitutes oppression of the self to a modern American may not have this same meaning in a traditional Hindu-Indian context. It must be recognized that although all cultures may adopt a moral position of respect for persons and of responsiveness to community, their embodiments take culturally variable forms.

Disorders

Imitation and self–other mapping may also explain cross-cultural differences in the symptoms and behaviors corresponding with many psychiatric disorders. Crafa and Nagel (in press) propose that patients may exhibit different behaviors across cultures because (1) they are learning different cultural behaviors and (2) they may experiencing disruptions to functions underlying imitation or self–other mapping. According to this theory, actions and psychological states are not mapped exhaustively. Instead, only actions that are analogous (‘Like Me’) to a person are mapped. The underlying fodder for this ‘Like Me’ framework may be predetermined by biological predispositions and previous social experiences. Anomalies among these predispositions – such as atypical epigenetic or neural processes – may lead to differences in the fundamental self and therefore in the ‘Like Me’ framework that the other is mapped onto.

Cultural Differences in Social Referencing

To our knowledge, no studies have specifically examined cross-cultural differences in social referencing. Even though cultures differ in their forms of communication, parenting practices, and social norms, some aspects of communication and emotion seem to be largely universal. For example, the expression and recognition of emotions (see Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002, for a review) and infants' reference to objects by pointing (Liszkowski et al., 2012) seem to be universal. In addition, an extensive study of early social cognitive skills in three cultures (Canada, India, and Peru) showed that gaze following and joint attention were not significantly different, despite widely varying parenting practices and social norms (Callaghan et al., 2011). Cultural differences have been reported in the frequency of mutual gaze in dyadic face-to-face interactions of parents and their young infants, with Nso parents engaging in less direct eye contact than German parents (Kärtner et al., 2010; Keller et al., 2011). However, it is unknown whether there is a relation between early mutual gaze and the later emergence of social referencing.

With little variation in the basic skills of emotion recognition, gaze following, and joint attention, it seems likely that social referencing would also be present cross-culturally. The primary difference in social referencing across cultures may rather be in the content of what children learn, rather than the use of referencing itself. That is, the mechanism of social referencing may be universal, but the information gained through social referencing regarding what should be approached or avoided could depend on what culture the infant is a part of. A second possible difference could be in the individuals targeted during social referencing. For example, if children in some cultures spend more time with siblings than their parents (e.g., Harkness and Super, 1995), older children could be a more common source for social referencing information.

Framing Cultural Issues

Recent research on children's prosocial development has sought to explore cross-cultural differences. Cultural influences can arise at many points in children's prosocial behavior, not only in the way adults socialize prosocial behavior directly and indirectly, but also in the way that cultural tools and technologies afford particular behaviors. For example, societies with formal school systems radically change the types of interactions children have on a day-to-day basis, hence the opportunities, expectations, and demands for prosocial behavior.

Culture can be viewed as an additional influence on prosocial development that might influence differences in the frequency or timing of particular prosocial behaviors, either accelerating or delaying them, although the developmental pathways and mechanisms remain the same. Historically, the cognitive developmental approach to moral and prosocial development has framed it in terms of universal moral norms (e.g., respect for others) that originate in reason, and has argued against strong cultural relativism, which proposes moral thought and behavior unique to particular cultures. However, to the extent that these theories are constructvist, they clearly allow for individual differences. To some extent, the dichotomy between universality and relativism is also recreated in biological theories, albeit with common descent and heredity rather than reason as the framing point for universality.

Alternatively, culture can be seen as the medium in which all development, prosocial and otherwise, occurs (Rogoff, 2003). Cultural approaches may further invoke wholly separate cultural routes to prosocial development, involving different motivations and mechanisms by which children come to assist, comfort, and cooperate with others. For example, Kärtner et al. (2010) propose that German infants' prosociality develops out of a mentalistic self-other distinction, socialized by their mothers, whereas Indian infants additionally seem to display situational prosociality, which is oriented toward cooperative tasks and joint action as culture-specific characteristics. Arguably, this theoretical position can also be universalist in holding that human social functions, such as assisting others, develop universally, albeit through different pathways, i.e., individualistic versus collectivist norms (Greenfield et al., 2003). Of the major theoretical approaches to prosocial development, social learning theory is the most flexible in terms of examining and expecting broad cultural differences in prosociality.

Cultural Variation in FoR Use

In addition to the development of spatial categories, another key area of cross-cultural difference is in the use of FoR. Earlier in the article, we described young children's use of egocentric and allocentric frameworks. In addition to these FoRs, one can also encode spatial relationships with cardinal directions (i.e., north, south, east, west) which constitutes a geocentric FoR. Cross-cultural research has revealed that children in various parts of the world use a geocentric FoR to represent and describe locations (Haun et al., 2011; Majid et al., 2004). The use and development of this FoR, and the speed at which it is acquired, apparently varies as a function of culture (Henrich et al., 2010; Dasen and Mishra, 2010).

Numerous cases have been found globally where a geocentric FoR is the dominant style used, and develops much earlier than in Western groups, where it is typically learnt last and used least frequently. For example, it would be much more likely for a Western child to refer to a spoon behind a plate (relative to his/her own position), rather than west of it. However, the latter phrasing is common in a variety of languages, including those of the Yimithirr, Arrernte, and Warwa indigenous Australian peoples.

In a detailed compilation of studies conducted in Geneva and areas throughout Bali, Nepal, and India, Dasen and Mishra (2010) explore how a geocentric FoR develops in children as young as 4 years of age. These studies explore the conditions that favor the development of a geocentric FoR and its use in verbal and nonverbal spatial tasks. In the non-Westernized societies of Bali, Nepal, and India where tradition and language have been preserved, a geocentric FoR is preferred, even though these populations have the linguistic capability to use egocentric FoR. Children in the villages of Roopchandpur (India), Dolhaka (Nepal), and Sambangan (Bali) almost never used egocentric language when performing the research tasks. However, an egocentric FoR is sometimes chosen by younger children. This suggests that even though children brought up in these societies have the option of using an egocentric FoR, there is a marked preference for the geocentric referencing style.

In one of the studies referenced in the aforementioned book, Dasen and Wassmann (2004) compared Balinese and Swiss children on their uses of various FoRs. They found that the geocentric FoR was well established and used almost exclusively from 4 years of age by Balinese children, particularly those living in isolated locations and with less contact with the Indonesian language or media. Swiss children, in comparison, predominantly utilized an egocentric FoR when describing a scene, with no geocentric language at all being used in the task. Additionally, almost none of the Swiss children knew of the system of cardinal directions at 9–10 years of age.

Haun et al. (2011) explored cross-cultural use of FoRs in a series of nonlinguistic special memory tasks. They compared Dutch and Namibian children's ability to reconstruct spatial arrays of varying complexity from memory, according to their habitual (egocentric for the Dutch children and geocentric for the Namibian children) and nonhabitual linguistic FoRs. Children from both cultures were consistently impaired in their performance for their nonhabitual FoR, demonstrating that not only preference, but also competence in FoR use is linguistically aligned across cultures.

Unfortunately, as cross-cultural studies tend to examine children rather than infants, little is known regarding whether the differences outlined earlier are present prior to the development of language. Regardless, these cross-cultural differences pose an exciting new frontier for developmental scientists to better understand spatial thinking and its development in young children.

Is cross

What is cross

Does social psychology focus on culture?

Why is it important for psychologists to conduct cross